

1962 War - The Unknown Battles : Operations in Subansiri and Siang Frontier Divisions^{\$}

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
Introduction

Background

The 1962 Sino-Indian War was fought in two sectors; namely, the Western Sector (Ladakh) and the Eastern Sector (NEFA - now Arunachal Pradesh). In the Eastern Sector, a lot has been written about the battles in the Kameng Frontier Division (Tawang, Se La, Bomdi La etc) as also about the battle of Walong in the extreme East in the Lohit Frontier Division. However, there are hardly any accounts of the operations that took place in the Central Sector of NEFA, i.e. the Subansiri and Siang Frontier Divisions. It is generally believed that this area was dormant and no operations of significance took place. This is not true as will be evident from the narrative that follows.

Area of Operations

Please refer to **Map 'P'**. Basically, the terrain is rugged with altitudes ranging from 3600 m to 5500 m and the snowline at around 4500 m. The extent of the area (as the crow flies) from West to East (less Kameng and Lohit Frontier Division) is about 300 - 350 km and North - South (from the MacMahon Line to foothills) about a 100 - 150 km. However, due to criss crossing of the mountain ranges, inter valley movement is extremely difficult and time consuming. The road communications on the Indian side of the border were almost non-existent in 1962. The only motorable road that existed in the area of operations at that time was from Majorbari to Along. The area is sparsely populated. The important places along the border are; Asaphila, Limeking, Migyitun, Longju, Maja, Takaing (Dakesi), Menchuka, Jieju, Gelling, Tuting etc.



Prelude to Operations

Soon after the annexation of Xinjiang by the PRC in early 1950, Mao set into motion the process for annexation (liberation) of Tibet in Jan 1950 itself. However, the annexation of Tibet was a politico - military effort wherein, political actions took precedence over military operations. Due to compulsions of terrain, Tibetan resistance, Chinese sensitivities to the Tibetan issue etc. the whole process took much longer and was completed only by about the middle of 1952. However, by Jan 1952, the troops of 18th Army of PLA (52nd Division) had reached the Himalayas and hoisted the red flag in areas which they considered to be frontiers of China. PLA troops (154 and 155 Regiments of 52nd Division) were permanently stationed at suitable encampments in the Shannan and Linzhi (Nyingchi) Prefectures of Tibet, abutting NEFA.¹ However, due to lack of proper infrastructure and road communication on both sides, there was still considerable no man's land between the PLA troops and Indian police forces guarding the border.

The Longju Incident - Aug 1959

The Tibetan rebellion broke out on 10 Mar 1959 which was brutally suppressed by the PLA. The 14th Dalai Lama escaped and entered Indian territory on 31 Mar along with some followers, and was subsequently granted political asylum by India. This upset the Chinese authorities a great deal as they felt that the rebellion had been instigated by India and was aimed at securing 'Independence for Tibet'. However, this was far from the truth. The rebellion occurred due to the politics of repression followed by the Chinese in Tibet.

Shannan Region abutting western NEFA was considered by China to be the hotbed of 'Tibetan reactionaries'. This view seems to have been further reinforced by the fact that the Dalai Lama escaped to India through this region. The traditional routes from Lhasa to Tawang and beyond also pass through Shannan Region of Tibet. Shannan Region is considered extremely important by China. It is located southeast of Lhasa and is considered a gateway to erstwhile NEFA (Arunachal Pradesh). Chinese had identified 28 routes leading from Shannan Region into NEFA. It is also one of the main grain producing areas of Tibet. So, the Chinese reaction in Shannan was heavy and they employed nearly four

infantry regiments (154, 155, 159 and 401) to quell the rebellion in Shannan and thereafter established permanent posts to dominate the border with India.² Migyitun (in Tibet) was one such post on the border which was opposite and in close proximity to Longju (in India), a border post held by the Assam Rifles.

The Indian post at Longju irked the Chinese and in a note dated 23 June 1959 they accused Indian troops of intrusion and occupation of Migyitun and some other places in Tibet and their collusion with the Tibetan rebels.

It was at Longju in the Subansiri Frontier Division that the first armed clash took place between the PLA (2nd Company of 1st Regiment of Shannan Military Sub Command) and personnel of 9 Assam Rifles occupying the Indian post at Longju on 25 Aug 1959 which resulted in two Indian casualties. The issue was finally resolved through diplomatic channels and both sides withdrew from the area on 29 Aug 1960. However, after this incident, with effect from 27 Aug 1959, the defence of NEFA which till then was the responsibility of Intelligence Bureau (IB) under the Ministry of Home Affairs and Assam Rifles under the Ministry of External Affairs became the responsibility of the Indian Army. Though Assam Rifles was to continue to remain deployed on the border but henceforth, it would be under the operational control of the Army.³

The Indian Reaction

After the Longju incident, Assam Rifles did not reoccupy Longju and instead set - up a post at Maja, 10 km South of Longju, on 29 Aug 1959. At this stage, the responsibility for defence of the border was as under:-


- (a) Subansiri Frontier Division – 9 Assam Rifles.
- (b) Siang Frontier Division – 11 Assam Rifles.

In Nov 1959, 4 Infantry Division which till then was located at Ambala Cantt was ordered to move to Assam and given the responsibility for defence of entire NEFA. The chain of command ran upwards from HQ 4 Infantry Division at Tejpur to HQ 33 Corps at Shillong and on to HQ Eastern Command at Lucknow. 5 Infantry Brigade of 4 Infantry Division with its HQ at North Lakhimpur was made responsible for defence of the Rest of NEFA i.e. less Kameng Frontier Division. A battalion was moved for defence of Walong in the Lohit Frontier Division. Hereafter, we will be primarily concerned with the Subansiri and Siang Frontier Divisions.

The Chinese Build-Up

Please refer to Sketch ‘Q’. For the Chinese, this sector was of secondary importance and operations in this Sector were to be coordinated with the main offensive being launched in the Kameng (Tawang) Frontier Division. It was only on 27 Oct 1962 that the GHQ ordered the launch of offensives towards Limeking in the Subansiri Frontier Division, and towards Menchuka and Tuting in the Siang Frontier Division. The overall Chinese aim was to annihilate the Indian troops deployed in the Central Area of NEFA. To what extent it was achieved, it will be seen later.

Chinese did not have troops specially earmarked for the offensive in this area. They assembled an adhoc force of about three battalions (approximately 2200 troops) by milking units from Shannan Sub Area, Linzhi Sub Area and Lhasa Area. The command and control was also adhoc. The overall command was to be exercised by Tanguansan, the Political Commissar of Tibet Military Command. The main attack was to be launched on 18 Nov.⁴ However, before that, Chinese carried out preliminary operations from 21-30 Oct to capture and secure favourable positions along the border from where main attacks could be launched.



Subansiri Frontier Division

Indian Dispositions

1/5 GR (FF), a battalion of 5 Infantry Brigade was moved to Ziro in Nov 1959 and assigned the responsibility for the defence of Subansiri Frontier Division. In addition, it was also decided to set - up maximum number of Assam Rifles posts under “Operation Onkar”. During the period Jan – Oct 1962, nine Assam Rifles posts were set - up along the border.⁵ In May 1962, 1/5 GR (FF) was replaced by 2 JAK RIF, which established its HQ at Daporijo.

The Conference at Delhi - 15 Sep 1962

At this stage an interesting development took place which was to have far reaching repercussions on the Indian defensive posture in the whole of NEFA. On 15 Sep, a high level conference was held at Delhi in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) for which GOC-in-C Eastern Command was also called. At this conference, the Director IB pointed out enhanced level of threat in NEFA, particularly against Maja, Menchuka, Taksing, Tuting and Walong Sectors. Based on the decisions taken in this Conference, the following were ordered by HQ Eastern Command :-

- (a) Posts to be established North and northwest of Dhola between Dhola and McMahon Line; a post, if possible, to be established at Tsangle (Kameng Frontier Division).
- (b) Maja to be reinforced by a platoon.
- (c) One company to reinforce Menchuka.
- (d) One more company to Takaing. This was in addition to the one ordered previously.
- (e) One battalion to Walong.

As a result of the above, two battalions of the incoming 62 Infantry Brigade would be committed under 5 Infantry Brigade in Along and Walong respectively, leaving only one battalion with the Brigade which was actually meant for Tawang Sector. Secondly, reinforcing forward positions meant a major shift in the policy of the 'Defence Line' as laid down in the Army HQ Operation Instruction No. 25 and Eastern Command Operation Instruction No. 8 (Teju - Hayliang - Jairampur), northwards close to the frontier. The effect of this change was to prove disastrous later.⁶

Indian Defensive Posture

In the wake of imminent Chinese offensive in Oct 1962, the Subansiri Sector was bifurcated into two; Kamla Valley Sub Sector (comprising lower Subansiri District) and Subansiri Sub Sector (comprising Upper Subansiri Sub Sector). The responsibilities for defence were as under :-

- (a) **Kamla Valley Sub Sector.** 9 Assam Rifles with its HQ at Kimin. HQ of its A Wing was at Ziro with seven platoons and four sections.
- (b) **Subansiri Sub Sector.** 2 JAK RIF with its HQ at Daporijo. It had a company each at Takaing and Taliha, a company at Limeking and a company with the battalion HQ at Daporijo. In addition, 2 JAK RIF had under its operational command eleven platoons of 9 Assam Rifles and in support 69 Heavy Mortar Battery ex 44 Heavy Mortar Regiment, plus a platoon of 6 MAHAR (Machine Gun Battalion).

On 22 Oct, 5 Infantry Brigade was placed directly under command of the newly raised 4 Corps commanded by Lieutenant General BM Kaul. Till then, they were under 4 Infantry Division. 2 JAK RIF less three companies, 69 Heavy Mortar Battery and the Medium Machine Gun (MMG) Platoon less a section were ordered to move from Daporijo to Taliha on 22 Oct and were redeployed at Taliha by 24 Oct (the war had already started on 20 Oct).⁷

Chinese Offensive - Phase I (23 - 26 Oct)

Chinese attacks during Phase I have been indicated at Sketch 'Q'. As per the Indian accounts, approximately a battalion group of Chinese troops launched an attack on the morning of 23 Oct, against the border posts of Asaphila, Sagamla, Tamala and Potrang. As a result, all the forward posts were ordered to withdraw to Taliha under the orders of HQ 4 Corps issued through HQ 5 Infantry Brigade. In the attack on Asaphila, 2 JAK RIF troops are reported to have suffered one JCO and 17 Other Ranks as killed/ missing in action. Maja was also abandoned at 1500 hours on 23 Oct.⁸ By 26 Oct, all the Indian forward posts had been withdrawn and the Chinese troops would have occupied these. During this period (26 Oct-17 Nov) Chinese also set about improving the road communications to their intended launch pads for the main offensive which was taking shape from 27 Oct onwards and was set to commence on 18 Nov.

Indian Reorganisation

Towards the end of Oct, HQ 2 Infantry Division was raised under Major General MS Pathania and made responsible for defence of the Rest of NEFA, i.e less Kameng Frontier Division. The areas of responsibility were redefined with the induction of 192 Infantry Brigade. 5 Infantry Brigade was assigned the responsibility for Subansiri Sector, named as Sector 1 with effect from 13 Nov. The Brigade was to occupy a cohesive brigade defended sector. Five first lines of ammunition and 28 days of supplies were to be dumped. 1/4 GR ex 192 Infantry Brigade was also allotted to 5 Infantry Brigade. Alas, these measures came too late! By 18 Nov, the deployment of 5 Infantry Brigade was as under :-⁹

- (a) HQ 5 Infantry Brigade - North Lakhimpur.
- (b) 1/4 GR. Two companies at Daporijo and the Battalion less two companies at Taliha.
- (c) 2 JAK RIF. Two companies with a tactical HQ at Limeking and the Battalion less two companies at Taliha.
- (d) MMG Pl ex 6 MAHAR. A section at Limeking and the platoon less a section at Taliha.
- (e) 69 Heavy Mortar Battery - Taliha.

Chinese Main Offensive - Phase II

The Advance to Limeking (Limijin). The main attacking force was a battalion (approximately 650 men) of the 1st

Infantry Regiment ex-Shannan Sub Area under the Regimental Commander, Baiquan and its objective being Limeking. They had to first restore the bridge at Riyue which had been destroyed by the withdrawing Indian troops. It took them three days (14-17 Nov) to set-up a temporary bridge. The Chinese commenced their advance on 18 Nov and the first fire was exchanged with a protective patrol of 2 JAK RIF under Second Lieutenant MR Kishore. In a fire fight that lasted around 45 minutes, one Indian soldier was killed and the Chinese suffered six wounded. The Chinese advance was slow due to Indian resistance and difficult terrain which was made even more difficult due to some demolitions carried out by Indian troops. The Chinese managed to outflank Limeking and made contact with the main defences on the morning of 21 Nov. The Indian troops had already been ordered to withdraw from Limeking during Night 20/ 21 Nov to Daporijo. Thus, Chinese were able to secure Limeking by about 0830 hours on 21 Nov. The Chinese thereafter continued their advance towards Daporijo till last light 21 Nov, at which time they received orders to stop and return to Limeking.¹⁰

When the Army HQ learnt of the withdrawal orders issued by the Brigade, they countermanded the orders and issued instructions for the Brigade to occupy defensive positions in Area Taliha – Daporijo – Ziro. However, it was too late and Limeking had already been lost. It may also be noted that a number of Assam Rifles posts (atleast five) had been withdrawn without being attacked by Chinese.

The Siang Sector

Indian Dispositions

11 ASSAM RIFLES was deployed in the Siang Frontier Division in Jun 1959. In Nov 1959, when 4 Infantry Division took over the operational responsibility in NEFA, 2 MADRAS less two companies were at Along and a company each at Tuting and Menchuka. HQ 11 ASSAM RIFLES with 'A' Wing were at Along, with its 'B' and 'C' Wings in Areas Menchuka – Manigong and Tuting – Pasighat respectively. In Feb 1962, a post was also established at Gelling (40 km northeast of Tuting and 10 kms South of McMahon Line). As part of 'Operation Onkar' seven new Assam Rifles posts were established in this Sector by the middle of Sep 1962.¹¹ By this time the Chinese threat had become imminent and the Siang Sector was divided into three sub-sectors and the deployment was as under ¹² :-

- (a) **Menchuka Sub Sector.** 2/8 GR alongwith a company of 2 MADRAS and 'B' Wing of 11 ASSAM RIFLES with three platoons and a section MMGs ex 6 MAHAR were responsible for this sub sector.
- (b) **Manigong Sub Sector.** CO 11 ASSAM RIFLES was made the commander for this Sub Sector. The troops allocated were – 'B' Sub Wing of 11 ASSAM RIFLES with three platoons, section 3 inch mortars and a section MMGs.
- (c) **Tuting Sub Sector.** 2 MADRAS less a company with HQ 'C' Wing 11 ASSAM RIFLES with eight platoons and 70 Heavy Mortar Battery.
- (d) HQ 11 ASSAM RIFLES and 'A' Wing with four platoons were deployed in Area Along – Pasighat.

All troops were air maintained by Kalinga Airways. The advanced landing grounds (ALGs) were available at Along, Menchuka and Tuting.

Chinese Build-Up and Plan

The Tibet Command HQ mustered a strength of around 1650 troops by pooling in units/sub units from Command's independent battalion, two companies each from the Milin and Matuo Battalions of Linzhi Sub Area for operations in this Sector. The force was commanded by Yangyongen, Commander Linzhi Sub Area. Initially, the main attack was to be launched towards Menchuka and subsequently operations were to be developed towards Tuting – Gelling in the form of a pincer movement from South and North with the aim of annihilating the Indian troops deployed in these areas. Chinese troops had adequate artillery and engineer support for the operations.¹³

Chinese Offensive - Phase I (21 - 28 Oct)

In the Menchuka Sub Sector, the Chinese troops, in company strength occupied Lasam, about 45 minutes walking distance from Lamang towards the border on 21 Oct 1962. Two days later, on 23 Oct evening, the Chinese surrounded the Assam Rifles platoon at Lamang which was ordered to withdraw to Menchuka under orders from 4 Corps. In the fire fight that ensued, four soldiers of Assam Rifles were killed, besides three porters.

On 20 Oct, approximately two Chinese companies were reported at Dom La, in the Manigong Sub Sector, by the Assam Rifles patrols. On 24 Oct, the Chinese attacked the Indian post in the area Henkar - Domla. After some resistance, the troops were ordered to withdraw to Manigong. The Chinese, after bypassing Papikrong, attacked Manigong on the Morning of 28 Oct. The Indian troops withdrew to Karo. Subsequently, when the Chinese were reported to have withdrawn from Manigong, an attempt was made to recapture Manigong but proved unsuccessful.

In the Tuting Sub Sector, a platoon of 11 Assam rifles was deployed at Dilerrock (a border post). On 24 Oct, its observation post at the Pass was attacked by Chinese, employing a company size force. The platoon suffered three fatal casualties with two wounded. As a sequel to this, the troops at Lamdo La, Nayur La and Shoka La were withdrawn to Tuting. Thus, by the end of Oct, the Chinese had made ingress upto Lamang, Manigong and Jorging in the Siang Frontier Division.

Indian Reorganisation

Towards the end of Oct 1962, a review of the situation was carried out by the Corps Commander and GOC 2 Infantry Division. It was decided to hold on to present positions and strengthen the defences further. 5 Infantry Brigade was ordered to reinforce Menchuka. Some troops were air lifted from Along and Walong.

After the allocation of 192 Infantry Brigade to 2 Infantry Division, this Brigade was made responsible for the Siang Frontier Division. The Brigade was effective only by 12 Nov 1962. Its two battalions, 1/4 GR and 4 DOGRA were inducted into Subansiri and Lohit Sectors respectively. Thus, in the Siang Sector, 192 Infantry Brigade had under command 2 MADRAS and 2/8 GR, the latter was in the process of being moved piecemeal by air from Walong. The Brigade Sector was now reorganised into two sub sectors, Menchuka and Tuting, instead of three earlier. By 16 Nov (eve of the battle), the dispositions of 192 Infantry Brigade were as under :- ¹⁴

- (a) **Along.** HQ 192 Infantry Brigade, two Companies of 2/8 GR and HQ 11 ASSAM RIFLES with one platoon.
- (b) **Menchuka Sub Sector.** 2/8 GR less two companies, company 2 MADRAS, 3 inch mortar platoon and a section MMGs.
- (c) **Tuting Sub Sector.** 2 MADRAS less a company, two MMG platoons ex 6 MAHAR and ten platoons of 11 ASSAM RIFLES.
- (d) **Artillery.** 70 Heavy Mortar Battery.

Chinese Main Offensive - Phase II (16 - 21 Nov)

On 16 Nov, the Chinese started their advance from Manigong with the Milin Battalion heading for Tuting and the Independent Battalion going for Menchuka. On 17 Nov, the troops of Independent Battalion contacted the Indian defences at Nisangong and a brief fire fight ensued. The plans to reinforce Menchuka with 2/8 GR troops from Along could not materialise due to poor flying conditions. While Brigade Commander was at Chaluna on 8 Nov to meet GOC 2 Infantry Division, orders were received from Headquarters 4 Corps to stop induction of two companies of 2/8 GR into Menchuka from Along. Instead, troops from Menchuka were to be moved to Along. The withdrawal was to commence on night 18/19 Nov. Even the Brigade Commander and Battalion Commander felt that Menchuka was untenable.

Menchuka was vacated on the night of 18/19 Nov and the Chinese occupied it by the morning of 19 Nov. The Independent Battalion was tasked to progress operation towards Tuting. The withdrawal from Menchuka by 2/8 GR proved disastrous. A small party of 35 led by the Commanding Officer Lieutenant Colonel DA Taylor who ventured out on a 'hunters track' to Tato, got lost. Many died of exhaustion including the Commanding Officer. The main party under Major Dar was ambushed on Menchuka-Tato track on 20 Nov. In the process of withdrawal, 2/8 GR suffered 42 casualties including three officers and 12 taken as prisoners of war (PsW). Out of a total force of 13 officers, 18 JCOs and 826 OR at Menchuka; eight officers, four JCOs and 150 OR were reported to have been killed / missing or taken PsW.

The Chinese column which had contacted Nisangong on 17 Nov was approximately of two companies strength, whereas Menchuka was held by over 800 regular troops, besides six platoons of Assam Rifles. It is apparent that the commanders just lost the will to fight. It was the Brigade Commander who on 17 Nov influenced the Corps Commander about the inability to defend Menchuka with the available troops.

It is evident that the GOC 2 Infantry Division and the staff were not consulted on withdrawal from Menchuka. GSO 1 of 2 Infantry Division had sent a signal to HQ 4 Corps, stating that Menchuka should not be abandoned without a fight and had requested that the decision to withdraw from Menchuka be taken up with the Corps Commander.

On 21 Nov, the Chinese occupied Gelling. On 22 Nov, when closing up with Tuting, they learnt that the position had already been vacated. As per the higher directions, the troops of Independent Battalion stopped their pursuit in the wake of orders for ceasefire.

The Tibet Military command ordered the units of Shanan and Linzhi Sub Areas to fall back to Limeking and Menchuka and consolidate while awaiting further orders. 2 Infantry Division ordered 192 Infantry Brigade to concentrate the withdrawing troops at Pasighat. 11 Assam Rifles was made responsible for the defence of Along and also assist in the withdrawal of units. Army Headquarters, instead ordered 192 Infantry Brigade to occupy defences around Along. The Brigade was also asked to reoccupy Tuting with Assam Rifles troops, if not occupied by the Chinese. The same was occupied by a platoon of Assam Rifles on 25 Nov.

Chinese Casualties

During Phase I of the operations, Chinese seem to have suffered negligible casualties. As per the Chinese account, they suffered the following casualties during Phase II of the operations in Subansiri and Siang Sectors :- ¹⁵

	Officers	Soldiers	Total
(a) Killed	2	12	14
(b) Wounded	2	20	22

Indian Casualties

The overall figures are not available. However, casualties in different engagements wherever available have been indicated in the text.

An Assessment

As in the Kameng and Walong Sectors, the Chinese aim in the Subansiri and Siang Sectors was also to annihilate the

Indian troops deployed there and then to withdraw to their starting positions unilaterally. While they were able to make limited gains in the border areas, they were not able to achieve their operational aim (annihilation) for a number of reasons as brought out in the subsequent paras.

The Chinese troops for the offensive were drawn from disparate commands; altogether a force of approximately 2200 troops (three battalions). There were apparently no reserves to maintain the momentum of attack. The command and control was also adhoc; the Political Commissar of the Tibet Military Command being the overall commander and his staff being pooled in from Shannan and Linzhi Sub Areas. The troops could not have trained as a cohesive force for their impending task.

In keeping with their operational concepts, Chinese had secured the border passes and certain other favourable positions South of the border prior to launching of main attacks so that they could develop communications, build up logistics and obtain detailed information about Indian deployment. They had also planned a pincer movement between the forces attacking Menchuka and the Motua Independent Battalion for capture of Tuting but did not quite succeed. At one stage, on 20 Nov at about 1400 hours, the Chinese forces in Area Tuting-Minying did notice approximately 150 Indian troops moving from the direction of Menchuka towards Tuting but local commanders failed to engage them misinterpreting them as the forward elements of an advancing Indian force and lost an opportunity. Overall, the operations lacked coordination and were poorly executed.

The success gained by the Chinese was not so much because of the brilliance of their campaign but more due to the inadequacies on the Indian side. A large number of Indian posts were withdrawn which were actually not attacked. The withdrawals from Limeking, Menchuka and Tuting were carried out without proper assessment of the situation by commanders in the chain. It seems that no proper defensive battles were fought. Perhaps, the debacles in the neighbouring Kameng and Lohit Frontier Divisions had a debilitating effect on the commanders and troops.

The overall force ratio in the Subansiri and Siang Sectors was in India's favour and there was no reason why we could not have got the better of the Chinese, atleast in this area. It can be said with certainty that the full combat potential of the two brigades (5 and 192 Infantry Brigades) defending this area was not brought to bear on the battles that took place. In addition, 181 Infantry Brigade which was available to HQ 2 Infantry Division was left unutilised throughout the war.

There were also some restraining factors on the Indian side. Firstly, there was a total lack of intelligence about Chinese strength, dispositions and intentions. Secondly, Indian troops were being inducted and regroupings carried out in the wake of impending operations. Command and control was changed too frequently and as a result troops were not quite prepared for their operational tasks when the hostilities commenced. Thirdly, various contingencies that could arise in battle were neither planned, nor rehearsed. It would seem that the units/sub-units, in the most difficult and rugged terrain, were being moved around as if these were mechanised units, with obvious results.

It also emerges from the above narrative (as seen from the decisions of 15 Sep 1962 Conference at the MoD) that the higher direction of war had come down to ordering of company and platoon posts; and that too at the behest of the IB. No thought appears to have been given to evolving a comprehensive strategy and an operational plan to meet the emerging Chinese threat.

Lastly, lack of air support must have been acutely felt by the troops on ground - but for that the responsibility must lie at the national level. However, it must be acknowledged that the air transport support in all these inaccessible areas was always forthcoming and that is what helped in moving and sustaining these troops, where road communications were practically non-existent.

Endnotes

1. Chinese Book, A History of Counter Attack War in Self Defence Along Sino-Indian Border, Academy of Military Science Publications, 1994, Chapter 2, Section 1.
2. Ibid.
3. History of the Conflict with China 1962, History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, New Delhi, 1992, page 39.
4. Chinese Book, op. cit., Chapter 5, Section 4.
5. These posts were at : Yatey, Dharma, Pagak, Kashongla, Sagamla, Tamala, Potrang, Asaphila and Chimpungla (not shown in Sketch 'Q').
6. Extract of the Henderson Brooks Report put on the Internet by Neville Maxwell on 17 Mar 2014, page 75.
7. History of the Conflict with China, op. cit. 3, Page 262.
8. Ibid, page 264.
9. Ibid, page 266.
10. Chinese Book, op. cit. 4.
11. These posts were at : Lamang, Henker, Nayu La, Shoka La, Lamdo La, Lusha La and Hunter's Track (not shown in Sketch 'Q').
12. History of the Conflict with China, op. cit. 3, Page 272.

13. Chinese Book, op cit. 4.
14. History of the Conflict with China 1962, op. cit. 3, Page 277.
15. Chinese Book, op. cit. 1, Statistical Tables.

(Authors' Note : In order to avoid clutter it has not been possible to show all the place names mentioned in the text on Sketch 'Q'. Chinese names of places and commanders are mentioned in italics).

\$This article is in continuation of the four earlier articles "1962-Battle of Se-La and Bomdi-La", "1962-The Battle of Namka Chu and Fall of Tawang", "1962 - War in the Western Sector (Ladakh)" and 1962 War - Operations in the Walong Sector published in Oct-Dec 2011, Apr-Jun 2013, Jul-Sep 2013 and Apr-Jun 2014 Issues of USI Journal, respectively.

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